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Abstract
This is Part II in a two-part series discussing the development of investigative support for information conﬁdentiality. In Part I,
we proposed a technique based on relation algebra to detect conﬁdential information leakage via protocol-based covert channels.
In this paper, we continue developing investigative support for information conﬁdentiality. We examine the application of the
technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage proposed in Part I in cryptanalysis and digital forensics to highlight its
usefulness beyond the scope of covert channel analysis. By way of a short case study, we show the automation of the cryptanalysis
application of the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage using a prototype tool and a known-plaintext attack.
c© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction and Motivation
In information security, the protection of information from unauthorised disclosure is known as conﬁdentiality.
Today, many organisations take signiﬁcant measures in an eﬀort to maintain the conﬁdentiality of their information.
One way to achieve conﬁdentiality of information is by employing cryptographic techniques (e.g., Schneier1). Cryp-
tographic techniques provide a means for encoding information using an enciphering algorithm and a cryptographic
key for transforming the information that is to be protected, called the plaintext, to a form that is unreadable by any
party that does not know the cryptographic key, called the ciphertext. In this way, it is required that anyone wishing
to read the plaintext from the ciphertext must know the cryptographic key. However, with the use of cryptanalysis
techniques, it is possible to uncover the plaintext from the ciphertext, even if the cryptographic key is unknown.
In this paper, we investigate the application of the algebraic technique for detecting conﬁdential information leak-
age described in Part I of this series of papers2 and in Jaskolka et al. 3 as a cryptanalysis technique. The proposed
cryptanalysis technique uses the relational representation of information and the tests and computations provided by
the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage along with the idea of a known-plaintext attack (e.g.,
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Bishop4) which is an attack model where the attacker has samples of both the plaintext and its ciphertext. An ap-
plication of the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage in the area of cryptanalysis highlights its
usefulness beyond the scope of covert channel analysis which was detailed in Part I of this series of papers2.
The cryptanalysis technique proposed in this paper, in conjunction with the theoretical foundations of the relation
algebraic technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage presented in Part I of this series of papers2, are
steps towards the generation of investigative support for information conﬁdentiality. We aim to provide tools and
mechanisms for maintaining the conﬁdentiality of information. In particular, we look to develop formal methods
for aiding in digital forensic investigations of violations of conﬁdentiality as the annual costs associated with such
violations have been estimated to average approximately $11.6 million5. As more and more conﬁdential information
needs to be protected, the need for this kind of support is growing exponentially.
In Section 2, we present the necessary mathematical background of relations. In Section 3, we recall the high-
lights of the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage described in Part I of this series of papers2. In
Section 4, we examine the application of the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage in the area of
cryptanalysis. In Section 5, we discuss the automation of the proposed cryptanalysis technique using a prototype tool
implemented in the Haskell functional programming language. In Section 6, we demonstrate the use of the prototype
tool for performing a cryptanalysis on a simple case study. In Section 7, we provide a brief discussion of the appli-
cation of the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage in cryptanalysis and digital forensics. Lastly, in
Section 8 provide some concluding remarks and discuss future work.
2. Mathematical Background
For two sets X and Y , a relation R on X×Y is a subset of the Cartesian product X×Y . In the remainder of this paper,
the identity relation is denoted by I, the universal relation is denoted by L and, the empty relation is denoted by ∅.
Additionally, we have three important operations on relations that are needed for the rest of the paper: composition,
converse, and complement.
Deﬁnition 1 (e.g., Schmidt & Ströhlein6). Let P ⊆ X × Y and Q ⊆ Y × Z be relations.
1. The relational composition of P and Q is given as P ; Q def= {(x, z) | ∃(y | y ∈ Y : (x, y) ∈ P ∧ (y, z) ∈ Q )}.
2. The converse of P is given as P def= {(x, y) | (y, x) ∈ P}.
3. The complement of P is given as P def= {(x, y) | (x, y)  P}.
We also have a special operation on relations called the residue. Residues help solve equations of the form P ; X = Q
or X ; P = Q.
Deﬁnition 2 (Schmidt & Ströhlein6). Let P and Q be two relations.
1. Q/P def= Q ; P is the left residue of Q by P 2. P\Q def= P ; Q is the right residue of Q by P
The left residue is the greatest relation X such that X ; P ⊆ Q and the right residue is the the greatest relation X such
that P ; X ⊆ Q. This result is summarised in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Let P, Q and X be relations.
1. X ; P ⊆ Q ⇐⇒ X ⊆ Q/P 2. P ; X ⊆ Q ⇐⇒ X ⊆ P\Q
Proof. The proof can be found in Schmidt & Ströhlein6.
Sometimes we require that a relation be a left residue and right residue simultaneously. This notion is called the
symmetric quotient.
Deﬁnition 3 (e.g., Schmidt & Ströhlein6). Let P and Q be two relations. Then, syq(P,Q) def= P ; Q ∩ P ; Q =
(P\Q) ∩ (P/Q) is the symmetric quotient of P and Q.
The symmetric quotient syq(P,Q) of two relations P and Q is deﬁned as the greatest relation X such that P ; X ⊆ Q
and X ; Q ⊆ P.
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3. A Technique for Detecting Conﬁdential Information Leakage
In this section, we summarise the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage on monitored commu-
nication channels. The details of the technique can be found in Part I of this series of papers2.
3.1. A Relational Representation
Jaskolka & Khedri7 discussed how we can view information sent over communication channels as being encap-
sulated in a data structure of some dimension. This data structure has ﬁelds in which the information is embedded.
Because of this, in the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage, we represent the information sent on
a communication channel as a relation (i.e., a series of data structures which are sent over time). At each time, an
element of information is sent. If we model time by N and the set of information (or data) by D, then a stream S is a
subset of N × D and therefore it is a relation.
In order to uncover an information leakage, it is suﬃcient to ﬁnd an abstraction relation between the conﬁdential
information and the stream of information observed to be have been sent on a communication channel. In Figure 1, P
represents the conﬁdential information which should not be sent on the channel, Q represents the information observed
by a monitor watching the information sent on the communication channel, and X represents an abstraction relation
relating P and Q. An abstraction relation X requires that the diagram given in Figure 1 commutes.
P
X
Q
N DP
DQ
Fig. 1: A representation of the relationship between the relations P and Q via the abstraction relation X
We consider an information leakage to be detected if and only if there exists an abstraction relation, diﬀerent from
the empty relation ∅ and the universal relation L, relating the conﬁdential information and information observed to be
have been sent on a communication channel.
3.2. The Technique
The technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage has two components: monitoring the information sent
on the communication channel and ﬁnding and computing an abstraction relation relating the conﬁdential information
to the observed information.
A monitor that is pre-equipped with the relation corresponding to the set of conﬁdential information P, deﬁned by
the system security policy, records the communication among agents when a communication channel is established.
The monitor watches the stream of packets being transmitted from authorised agents to unauthorised agents and
constructs the relational stream of information being sent Q. After observing the information that has been sent,
the monitor needs to determine whether the conﬁdential information has been leaked in any form by verifying the
existence of an abstraction relation X relating P and Q.
Since the monitor knows the relation corresponding to the conﬁdential information P and the relation corresponding
to the observed information Q, the existence of an abstraction relation X relating P and Q can be veriﬁed using
Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. X ; P = Q has a solution if and only if Q = (Q/P) ; P.
Proof. The proof can be found in Jaskolka et al. 8.
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Proposition 2 is a test to verify if there is an abstraction between the observed information and the conﬁdential
information. This test is directly related to commutativity of the diagram in Figure 1. If the test holds, we can say
that the conﬁdential information P seems to have been leaked using the abstraction given by X and was sent as the
observed information Q.
Corollary 1. Let P be the relation containing conﬁdential information. Let Q be a relation representing an informa-
tion observed on the monitored communication channel. The conﬁdential information contained in P is being leaked
as that represented by Q if and only if P = Q ; (Q\P) ∨ Q = P ; (P\Q).
Proof. The proof can be found in Jaskolka et al. 8.
In Corollary 1, we verify the way(s) in which the diagram in Figure 1 commutes. Each term of the disjunction in
the test corresponds to one of the ways in which Figure 1 can commute. As long as we can satisfy at least one of the
ways in which the diagram commutes, we can ﬁnd an abstraction relation X relating the conﬁdential information P to
the observed information Q.
We can compute the abstraction relation X with Proposition 3.
Proposition 3. Let P and Q be relations. X ; P = Q has a solution X = R ∩ (Q/P) if and only if Q ⊆ (R ∩ (Q/P)) ; P.
Proof. The proof can be found in Jaskolka et al. 8.
The relation R plays the role of a ﬁlter and allows for the removal of some unwanted elements of the transmitted
sequences. The ﬁlter R allows us to select only those elements of the transmitted sequences which we are interested in
examining further. In its most general case, if we consider the ﬁlter R to be the universal relation L, we are interested
in all of the elements of the transmission. Otherwise, we can select the elements of the range of the conﬁdential
information for which we wish to ﬁnd an abstraction by choosing diﬀerent ﬁltering relations for R. Corollary 2 gives
three cases for which we can compute the abstraction relation X.
Corollary 2. Let P be the relation containing conﬁdential information. Let Q be a relation representing an infor-
mation observed on the monitored communication channel. Let R be a ﬁltering relation allowing for the selection
of particular elements of the relations P and Q. The conﬁdential information included in P is being leaked as that
represented by Q via the abstraction relation X such that
1. X = R ∩ (Q\P) if and only if P ⊆ Q ; (R ∩ (Q\P))
2. X = R ∩ (P\Q) if and only if Q ⊆ P ; (R ∩ (P\Q))
3. X = R ∩ syq(P,Q) if and only if P ⊆ Q ; (R ∩ (Q\P)) ∧ Q ⊆ P ; (R ∩ (P\Q))
Proof. The proof can be found in Jaskolka et al. 8.
The above tests and computations represented by Proposition 2 and Proposition 3, and consequently Corollary 1
and Corollary 2, provide the core for determining the existence of an abstraction relation between the conﬁdential
information and the information observed to have been sent on the communication channel. As shown in Part I of
this series of papers2, equipped with this technique, it is possible to detect the leakage of conﬁdential information via
monitored protocol-based covert channels in a digital forensics context (i.e., investigation after the information has
already been sent).
4. A Cryptanalysis Technique
Consider a scenario where an encrypted communication between two agents is intercepted. Suppose that while
attempting to decipher the encrypted message, the analyst has an intuition that the message contains some important
pieces of information (i.e., a date, a location, a name, etc.). Equipped with the technique for detecting conﬁdential
information leakage, the analyst can perform an investigation into the observed (intercepted) information transmitted
between the agents. For instance, the analyst can run the test for an abstraction relation (Corollary 1) between the
observed information and the information for which he/she suspects may have been sent. For example, the analyst may
suspect that the transmission contains the suspected location of where an important meeting has taken place. If we
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allow these assumptions to form a conﬁdential information, then the technique for detecting conﬁdential information
leakage can be used to search for an abstraction relation relating the suspected plaintext to the intercepted ciphertext
message. If an abstraction relation can be found relating some plaintext to the intercepted ciphertext message, the
analyst can begin to develop the cryptographic key that may have been used. This procedure is very much like those
developed by Alan Turing at Bletchley Park during World War II when deciphering the codes of the Enigma machine,
which use known-plaintext attacks to analyse ciphertexts9.
Consider the scenario where an analyst needs to decrypt a ciphertext, N characters in length. In performing the
cryptanalysis, the analyst must begin by enumerating all of the ciphertext characters (if necessary). We denote the set
of all ciphertext characters as DC and the set of all plaintext characters as DP. Assume that the analyst models the
position of each character in the ciphertext by N. Then, the analyst is able to construct the relational representation of
the ciphertext as a relation C ⊆ N ×DC . Next, the analyst guesses a fragment of plaintext which is suspected to occur
in the ciphertext. We denote the plaintext fragment as P = p1p2 . . . pn where ∀(i | 1 ≤ i ≤ n ≤ N : pi ∈ DP ). The
length of the plaintext fragment is denoted by n. The idea is to check if there exists an abstraction relation between
the plaintext fragment and any ciphertext fragment of length n for all positions in the ciphertext. This relationship is
shown in Figure 2. In order to test for an abstraction relation, the plaintext fragment needs to be represented as a set
of relations Pi ⊆ N ×DP such that ∀(i | 1 ≤ i ≤ N − n : Pi = {(i, p1), (i + 1, p2), . . . , (i + n − 1, pn)} ). Similarly, we
construct the corresponding fragments of the ciphertext as relations Ci ⊆ N × DQ such that ∀(i | 1 ≤ i ≤ N − n :
Qi = {(i, ci), (i + 1, ci+1), . . . , (i + n − 1, ci+n−1)} ).
Pi
Ki
Ci
N DP
DC
Fig. 2: A representation of the relationship between a plaintext fragment Pi and ciphertext fragment Ci via the abstraction relation Ki
The analyst runs the test given in Corollary 1 for each pair of corresponding plaintext, ciphertext pairs
(i.e., Pi = Ci ; (Ci\Pi) ∨ Ci = Pi ; (Pi\Ci) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N − n). Each positive test result indicates that there ex-
ists an abstraction relation between the guessed plaintext fragment and the corresponding ciphertext fragment. This
indicates the presence of a possible cryptographic key fragment Ki. The analyst can compute each of the possible
cryptographic key fragments by applying Corollary 2 for each (Pi,Qi) pair yielding a positive test result. With the
possible cryptographic key fragments, the analyst can apply the key fragment to the ciphertext, which can reveal part
of the plaintext. With the additional information provided by applying the possible cryptographic key fragments, the
analyst can generate a new, more reﬁned guess at a plaintext fragment suspected of occurring in the ciphertext and
repeat the process. The analyst may be able to infer a larger fragment of the message with some intuition of the
neighbouring characters in the message. The process is very likely to converge on the complete cryptographic key
thus decrypting the given ciphertext message.
5. Automated Cryptanalysis using a Prototype Tool
In Part I of this series of papers2, we reported on a prototype tool, written in the functional programming language
Haskell, that allows for the automation of the tests and computations presented in technique for detecting conﬁdential
information leakage. In addition to the covert channel analysis service, the prototype tool also provides a cryptanalysis
service. The cryptanalysis service oﬀers the ability to perform a cryptanalysis based on the technique for detecting
conﬁdential information leakage and a known-plaintext attack as described in Section 4. We demonstrate the use of
the prototype tool for performing a cryptanalysis on a simple case study in Section 6. For more details regarding the
usage of the tool for cryptanalysis and for the complete analysis of a larger example using the Zodiac 408 cipher10,
we refer the reader to Jaskolka et al. 8.
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6. A Case Study of the Automation of the Proposed Cryptanalysis Technique
Using the prototype tool described in Jaskolka et al. 8, we have automated the process of applying the proposed
cryptanalysis technique. In Deavours & Kruh11, we ﬁnd a ciphertext originally encrypted using a German Army
Enigma machine. This message has since been decrypted and roughly translated into English in Weierud12. For
illustrative purposes in this case study, we use a portion of the English translation of this message. Since we are
dealing with a message that was sent by an army, the need for conﬁdentiality cannot be stressed enough as the
unauthorised disclosure of the plaintext of this message could have devastating consequences.
For the purpose of this case study, we have encrypted the message using a substitution cipher. Table 1 shows the
ciphertext in its entirety. We provide the highlights of the tool usage for applying the cryptanalysis technique and
show how the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage, in conjunction with a known-plaintext attack,
can break the cipher to uncover the message.
Table 1: Case study ciphertext message
As preparation for the analysis, we ﬁrst need to enumerate each of the cipher characters so that we are able to
represent them for use with the prototype tool. The enumeration is given in Table 2.
We start by loading the prototype tool modules in the Glasgow Haskell Compiler’s interactive environment (ghci)
as follows:
> :load PrototypeTool
We store the enumerated representation in a ﬁle for use with the prototype tool. From this point forward, we call the
ﬁle containing the enumerated ciphertext cipher.rel. We construct the relational representation of the information
contained in the cipher.rel ﬁle and store it in the newly created data store, CryptanalysisDB, by issuing the
following commands:
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Table 2: Case study ciphertext character enumeration
> new "CryptanalysisDB"
> loadRel "cipher.rel" "cipher" "CryptanalysisDB"
> cipher <- select "cipher" "CryptanalysisDB"
The idea is to guess a known word or phrase that is likely to appear in the plaintext message corresponding to
the given ciphertext. It is assumed that we know the context of the message. Therefore, we know that the cipher
was written during a time of battle and it might be suspected that the author may have been conveying orders to a
brigade of commanders and troops. So, we might expect to ﬁnd words such as “orders”, “troops”, or “forces” in some
reference to the conveyance of orders. These would oﬀer formidable starting points for the analysis. However, for
simplicity, brevity, and illustrative purposes, suppose that we have obtained a tip by some means (it is not important
how) that the message may refer to an attack on a fortiﬁcation which must not fall to the enemy. Therefore, we might
guess that the plaintext message contains the phrase “FORTIFICATIONS MUST BE HELD”. Using the prototype
tool, we generate a relation based on this phrase. In our representation of the phrase, we use only uppercase letters
and ignore spaces as we are simply trying to ﬁnd a readable plaintext based on the assumption that spaces are not
encoded. We generate a relation based on this phrase by issuing the following command with the prototype tool:
> let phrase = relFromString "FORTIFICATIONSMUSTBEHELD"
Next, we apply the cryptanalysis procedure based on the proposed technique described in Section 4. We use the
following command:
> cryptanalysis phrase cipher
As a result of applying the cryptanalysis technique, we ﬁnd that we have two fragmented possibilities for the
cryptographic key. After examining the two possible plaintexts (which are generated by the prototype tool, but not
shown here due to space limiations), we see that there is only one plaintext which appears to make any sense. Based
on the sensible plaintext, we ﬁnd that our phrase is succeeded by “A _ _ L _ C O _ _ S” which might suggest that
the our guessed phrase is followed by the phrase “AT ALL COSTS”. We can concatenate our original phrase and this
new phrase to have a much more reﬁned phrase. After this reﬁnement, we apply the cryptanalysis with the phrase
“FORTIFICATIONS MUST BE HELD AT ALL COSTS”. The process of performing the cryptanalysis and its output
are given below.
> let phrase’ = relFromString "FORTIFICATIONSMUSTBEHELDATALLCOSTS"
> cryptanalysis phrase’ cipher
The 1 fragmented key possibility is:
{
"A" |-> ["23","33"]
"B" |-> ["20"]
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"C" |-> ["22"]
"D" |-> ["53"]
"E" |-> ["12","51"]
"F" |-> ["38","45"]
"H" |-> ["48"]
"I" |-> ["1","6","8"]
"L" |-> ["32","7"]
"M" |-> ["31"]
"N" |-> ["46"]
"O" |-> ["30","34"]
"R" |-> ["17"]
"S" |-> ["25","28","41"]
"T" |-> ["16","40","47"]
"U" |-> ["24"]
}
The 1 possible plaintext is:
I _ T H _ C A S E O F F R E _ C H
A T T A C _ S O _ _ H E _ E S T _
_ _ F O _ T I F _ C A T I _ _ S _
L _ H O U _ H U _ _ I _ _ _ _ _ T
T H I _ M O M _ N _ T H _ S _ F O
R T I F I C A T I O N S M U S T B
E H E L D A T A L L C O S T S _ _
_ N A _ A _ _ _ T _ U M E _ _ C _
L L _ S U _ _ R _ _ _ F O R C _ S
C O M M A _ D E _ S _ _ _ T _ _ _
_ _ M U S T B E I M B U _ _ _ I T
H _ H E _ _ _ O U _ _ F T H I S _
U _ _ _ N A C C _ R _ A _ C _ _ I
T _ _ _ D _ _ S _ _ M _ H _ S _ _
_ _ _ A T I A L O N E H _ _ _ T _
E _ I _ _ T T _ _ U T _ _ _ _ S E
_ H E F _ _ T _ F I C _ T I _ _ S
T O B E _ B A _ D _ _ _ D I N _ H
_ _ _ _ _ _ A R T
As a result of applying the cryptanalysis, we ﬁnd that we are left with only one fragmented cryptographic key.
As an example, the prototype tool outputs a relation which contains "T" |-> ["16","40","47"], showing that the
letter ‘T’ corresponds to ciphertext characters enumerated as 16, 40, and 47 (in particular “L”, “I”, and “•”). One can
easily ﬁll in many of the blanks in the possible plaintext to reconstruct the original message, which is given in Table 3.
We have demonstrated the application and automation of the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leak-
age in the context of cryptanalysis. This illustrates the usefulness of the technique beyond the scope of covert channel
analysis and detecting conﬁdential information leakages. Using the short illustrative example above, we have shown
that in a cryptanalytic investigation where we may be able to perform a known-plaintext attack, we are able to uncover
the encrypted message using the proposed cryptanalysis technique.
7. Discussion
Successful cryptanalysis has helped inﬂuence history as far back as the 1500s13. The beneﬁts of leveraging crypt-
analysis for diplomatic, military, and commercial purposes is recognised by many governments to this day. While it
can be perceived that cryptanalysis malevolently poses a threat to the conﬁdentiality of information since it provides
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Table 3: Case study plaintext message
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21
A I N T H E C A S E O F F R E N C H A T T A
B C K S O N T H E W E S T E R N F O R T I F
C I C A T I O N S A L T H O U G H U N L I K
D E L Y A T T H I S M O M E N T T H O S E F
E O R T I F I C A T I O N S M U S T B E H E
F L D A T A L L C O S T S E V E N A G A I N
G S T N U M E R I C A L L Y S U P E R I O R
H F O R C E S C O M M A N D E R S A N D T R
I O O P S M U S T B E I M B U E D W I T H T
J H E H O N O U R O F T H I S D U T Y I N A
K C C O R D A N C E W I T H O R D E R S I E
L M P H A S I S E T H A T I A L O N E H A V
M E T H E R I G H T T O A U T H O R I S E T
N H E F O R T I F I C A T I O N S T O B E A
O B A N D O N E D I N W H O L E O R P A R T
a means for subverting cryptographic techniques that are in place to maintain conﬁdentiality, we argue that it can also
have a benevolence when we consider that the information that is being protected by the cryptographic techniques may
be the secrets of a large organisation that are being smuggled to an outsider. In this way, the cryptanalysis technique
presented in this paper can be seen as an extension to the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage
proposed in Part I of this series of papers2.
With the ongoing threat of insiders with malicious interest to cause harm or inappropriately access and divulge
information, we must strive to devise new support to investigate those individuals who may be responsible for the
breach of conﬁdentiality. As an example, we can examine the June 2010 investigation in the United States of America
with regards to a Russian spy ring, known as The Illegals Program. The spies were allegedly using various forms
of stealthy communications including steganography, cryptography, and even Morse Code-like radio signals14. This
example stresses the real threat of the leakage of information on conﬁdentiality and security. The implications of
conﬁdential information leakage on the scale of the international espionage highlights the importance of developing
techniques for supporting the preservation of conﬁdentiality in computer systems.
In this paper, we are developing investigative support for information conﬁdentiality. This involves looking at an
analysis from a digital forensics perspective. By its very nature, digital forensics is analysis after-the-fact15. Hence,
the primary focus of a digital forensics investigation is placed on detection, that is, to prove that some form of violation
of the security policy has taken place, despite that it seems the policy is being respected. For example, in the course of
a forensic investigation of a conﬁdential information leakage from an organisation, an analyst may need to ascertain
whether a suspect made a call to a particular person with their mobile phone which has an encrypted SIM card. In
such a case, assuming that the mobile phone and SIM card have been seized, the analyst can apply the proposed
cryptanalysis technique to detect whether the name of the particular person exists in some form in the call history on
the SIM card to aid determining the innocence or guilt of the suspect.
The use of techniques for detecting conﬁdential information leakage in a digital forensics context is a new concept
for generating investigative support for information conﬁdentiality. Since we are dealing with analysis after-the-fact,
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performance is not a major consideration when developing detection mechanisms and cryptanalysis techniques. We
simply need the analysis to be done in a reasonable amount of time. The importance and necessity for this type of
application seems to be growing day by day as the need for protecting ever-growing amounts of private and sensitive
information continues to increase.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
We presented an application of the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage proposed in Part I
of this series of papers2 in the area of cryptanalysis and digital forensics which is part of the development of tools
for investigative support for information conﬁdentiality. The presented cryptanalysis technique uses the relational
representation of information and the tests to verify the existence of an abstraction relation and computations to ﬁnd
the abstraction relation if it exists from the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage in conjunction
with notions from known-plaintext attacks to aid in uncovering plaintext messages from a given ciphertext. We also
presented the automation of the proposed cryptanalysis technique using a short case study and our prototype tool.
The application of the technique for detecting conﬁdential information leakage in the area of cryptanalysis and
digital forensics reveals that the technique has the potential to be useful beyond detecting conﬁdential information
leakage and in areas other than covert channel analysis. More research into the applicability of the technique in
other application domains, particularly, those concerning the conﬁdentiality of information, is needed. This research
would involve more exploration into developing alternative tools and mechanisms for investigative support for infor-
mation conﬁdentiality. Furthermore, continual progress in the development of a more sophisticated and conﬁgurable
automation system to handle large scale examples for both covert channel analysis and cryptanalysis applications is
needed.
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